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the Indentures in a timely manner. The court also rejected MLWC's
argument that MHP had violated the 1910 Indenture by failing to operate the power plant and to pay rent. Because MLWC had not terminated the Indentures in a timely manner after violation of the 1924
Indenture, and because there were no other violations that prevented
MHP for being the second party to the Indentures, the court granted
MHP summaryjudgment on the issue of whether MHP was the proper
second party.
The court then considered MHP's rights and obligations as a second party. MHP claimed that it had a right to all water not otherwise
appropriated through other agreements predating June 1, 1910. The
court found that MHP, as the second party, had a right of first refusal
on expired agreements. The court granted partial summary judgment
to MHP, exempting from MHP's claim all leases not predatingJune 1,
1910, offered to and refused by a second party that remained under
contract with another party.
The court finally considered whether MHP was liable for past unpaid rent. The court considered three ways to construe the Indentures: as a lease, as a license, or as an ordinary contract. The court,
electing to take guidance from Vermont courts, decided to apply a
modem contract approach in the interest of equity and flexibility. Applying this approach, the court found that, under the Indentures, MHP
was liable to pay the minimum rent, but was also entitled to a full refund because of MLWC's failure to maintain the canal. Because requiring MHP to pay rent so that MLWC could refund MHP would be
pointless, the court granted summary judgment to MHP on this issue.
The court granted MHP's motion for summary judgment in part
and issued an order declaring MHP the proper second party under the
Indentures. The court stated MHP's rights under the Indentures as
requested by MHP, but excluded those water rights that did not predate June 1, 1910, and that the second party had refused, so long as
they remained under contract with another party.
Mark Terzaghi Howe
O'Reilly v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 04-940, 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXS 15787 (E.D. La. Aug. 10, 2004) (holding that the United
States Army Corps of Engineers abused its discretion in issuing a permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act absent an Environmental
Impact Statement in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act; the Corps failed to show a connection between the project's
adverse environmental impacts and the mitigation measures identified
in the Environmental Assessment in issuing the section 404 permit).
August Hand, Jr. filed an application with the United States Army
Corps of Engineers ("Corps") for a permit, in accordance with section
404 of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), for the dredging and filling of
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certain wetlands, a portion of which were protected wetlands under the
CWA. The Corps issued the permit after performing an Environmental Assessment ("EA") and determining that the project would not
significantly affect the environment in light of proposed mitigation
measures. Loretto O'Reilly, Jr. ("O'Reilly") filed suit against the Corps
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
to enjoin the permit claiming that the Corps illegally issued the permit
because the Corps did not prepare an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") in accordance with the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA"). O'Reilly and the Corps subsequently filed motions for
summaryjudgment on the merits.
O'Reilly contended that the Corps' decision to issue the permit in
the absence of an EIS was arbitrary and capricious because the Corps'
EA did not address the cumulative impacts of the project in light of
past and reasonably foreseeable development in the area, and because
the Corps did not analyze the mitigation measures proposed by the EA.
O'Reilly also contended that the Corps failed to consider the cumulative impacts of potential future phases of the development of which the
subject project was a component.
Section 404 of the CWA gives the Corps authority to issue permits
for the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable waters of
the United States, including wetlands. When considering an application for a section 404 permit, the NEPA requires the Corps to consider
the environmental impacts of their actions and prepare an EIS. The
Corps may decline to prepare an EIS even though the proposed project will result in significant environmental impacts where the permittee agrees to employ mitigation measures that will lower the otherwise
significant environmental impacts to a level of insignificance. The
Corps' decision not to prepare an EIS can only be set aside upon a
showing that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. Thus, the Corps must
provide enough analysis and data so that the court may insure that the
Corps has complied with the NEPA.
The court reviewed O'Reilly's and the Corps' motions for summary
judgment based solely on the administrative record and the applicable
law. The court concluded that the EA prepared by the Corps contained no support for the Corps' conclusion that the mitigation measures would reduce the identified adverse impacts of the project. Due
to the absence of a connection between the project's adverse impacts
and the proposed mitigation measures, the court assumed that the
Corps based its decision on speculation that the project successfully
mitigates the potential environmental impacts. Therefore, the Corps'
decision to issue the permit in the absence of an EIS was arbitrary and
capricious.
Further, the Corps contended that although the project was potentially just the first phase of a larger development, one that would ulti-
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mately require further permitting under the CWA, the project had an
independent utility apart from any future phases of the project. However, the court rejected this argument, concluding that the Corps
should have considered the other phases of the project because the
other phases were reasonably foreseeable.
The court ultimately concluded that the Corps had acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and abused its discretion by issuing the section 404
permit without preparing an EIS as required by NEPA and granted
O'Reilly's motion for summary judgment enjoining the section 404
permit issued by the Corps.
Donald E. Frick
United States v. Orr Water Ditch Co., 309 F. Supp. 2d 1245 (D. Nev.
2004) (holding: (1) because Tribe's water rights were federal reserved
rights the water rights were not subject to the theories of forfeiture,
abandonment, or failure to perfect; (2) a proposed change in water
usage from the amount currently used to the full amount of the water
right did not impairjunior appropriators' rights; (3) the Tribe was
immune from paying state fees associated with a water transfer; (4) and
the amount of water transferable was the amount of the water duty).
The Truckee-Carson Irrigation District ("Irrigation District") and
the City of Fallon ("Fallon") appealed to the United States District
Court, District of Nevada, the ruling of the State Engineer granting the
transfer applications for two of the Tribe's water rights. The United
States and the Tribe cross-appealed claiming they had a right to transfer more water than the State Engineer granted and claiming a right to
avoid paying fees associated with the transfer. The Tribe possessed two
water rights, Claim No. 1 and Claim No. 2 of the Orr Ditch Decree.
The Tribe wished to transfer water from both claims from bottom land
irrigation to instream fishery use for a period of one year. The United
States and the Tribe filed an application for both transfers in 2001 with
the Nevada State Engineer. The Tribe requested a transfer of 9,914
acre feet under Claim No. 1. The State Engineer granted a transfer of
8,420 acre feet. In addition, the Tribe requested a transfer of
15,344.55 acre feet under Claim No. 2 of which the State Engineer
granted a transfer of 11,254.5 acre feet. Several parties, including the
Irrigation District and Fallon, opposed the transfer of both water
rights.
In granting the transfer applications, the State Engineer ruled that
neither of the transfer applications could be contested on the basis
that the water rights were abandoned, forfeited, or not perfected. In
addition, the State Engineer stated that because the Tribe wished to
transfer the rights to fishery purposes, a primary purpose of the Tribe's
reservation, the Tribe need not apply for a new water right, but merely
satisfy the transfer requirements of state law.

